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Abstract. The fundamentals of formal logic, theory of sets and mathematical structures are narrated in terms of 
relations language. 
 
 
The present paper launches a series of three publications under the common title. In its first section 
relations language [RL], its formal logic [RL-logic], and on this basis RL-theory of sets and mathematical 
structures are offered. The latter appear as plurality of relations without minimal element, such plurality 
complying with thereafter defined properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitiveness. Such pluralities 
in general case are called “Binary relations filters” or 112R filters 1) .  
Let us instantly invoke a reservation that in RL-logic the notion of “set” presents a classification, 
but not an object. Null-set also disappears as an object, and the notions of point and one-point set 
coincide. It has a lot of corollaries. In particular, Zermelo theorem turns out to be unprovable, and 
presents particular axiom, and the paradoxes, which troubled the founders of the classical trend for so 
long time, disappear.    
In the second section 312R filters will be investigated, which induce not only usual topological 
structures, but also the objects, which do not comply with standard axioms.   
In the third section of the paper advanced techniques is used for investigation of various sets of 
measurable functions and linear densely defined operators.  
 
Section1. Relations language and its philosophy 
Two basic notions – truth and lie transpierce any sphere of activity of a human being.  
Philosophic notion of the truth, as “cognition ideality, which consists in coincidence of conceivable things 
with reality”, does not contribute something to mathematics, because the entire “reality” in mathematics 
is exactly “conceivable”. That is why the mathematicians came to an agreement to consider some “state 
of things” as evident, i.e. distinctly observed by mind’s eye, without regard to their “materialistic 
impletion”, and consequently as true.  At this, any statement about not true “state of things” was 
perceived as lie. And over a period of two millenniums development of philosophy and mathematics took 
place under the motto, that any declarative statement could be treated as true or lying. And though the 
belief in such “state of things” was every now and then undermined by arising semantic paradoxes, many 
hoped to find in future such “meta language”, where these paradoxes would become just impossible.  
In the course of time, obviously, awareness of the fact, that it is difficult to lay the world of 
thoughts into Procrustian bed of “truth – lie”, led not only to emergence of logics, absolutely refusing the 
principle of the third element exclusion [1,2], but also to emergence of polyvalent “logics” (see review 
[3]). But the essence of all new trends, to our mind, has remained unchanged – they appear to be 
successive attempts to narrow down the world of thoughts to certain plurality of algebraic rules, let them 
be not so elementary, as the code of practice with “true/lying” tables of classic logic.  
We suggest a different view on the language of mathematics, namely as on the language of 
relations. This view is based on the philosophical idea, which has been sporadically appearing since the 
times of Eudox, and which in 1902 was clearly stated by Henri Poincare [4]: “The fact is that it [science] 
is able to cognize not the essence of a thing, as naive dogmatists think, but only the relations between the 
things; beyond these relations there is no cognizable reality”.  
One of the most important consequences of this conceptual idea is that it enables to clearly 
formulate illusory notion of sense, which was previously perceived in philosophy as “inherent logical 
subject matter of a word, parole, phenomenon,…, the meaning perceived by mind”.  
Sufficiently detailed presentation of the history and philosophy of relations language could be 
found in [5, 6]. Here we will only try and briefly formulate its basic provisions.  
 
____________________ 
1)  The lower indices point at hereinafter defined properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitiveness in the relations plurality, 
which induces the structure. 
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So we accept as guide to action the thought of Poincare, that science is able to perceive not the 
essence of a thing, but only the relations between the things. Then:    
 primary indefinable notions of any theory could be only: “objects” – let us say “points” and “relations” 
between them, in which they exist. Points and relations are dualistic notions. The point does not exist, if 
it has no relations with the other points – otherwise we are not able to know something about it; and 
without points there are no relations, in which they do exist.  
 
Giving name to any object – a point, we imply also those relations, in which it exists with the other 
names. Some of the relations appear before our mind’s eye quite distinctly; about the others we can only 
guess, and we even have no suspicion about the existence of some. And that is why the “name” is not just 
some “convenient” combination of letters of the alphabet, accepted by us for expression of the names, 
because the names are realized only in the language, which expresses the relations between the 
denominated objects.  
We should underline that:  
 
 the “point” is the image of notional relation of equivalency. But those relations, that we perceive, do not 
discern its “inherent” content. With emergence of new relations the point can appear as a set of “diverse 
points”.  
 
Thus, the following issues appear before our mind’s eye: Universal of objects-points and Universal 
of relations between them – boundless notions. Imaginary horizon of points Universal and relations 
Universal is vague, not defined, and all the time it moves away from us, as far as we cognize it deeper and 
deeper. That is why the relations field between the names senses, which constantly expands, forces us to 
acknowledge, that some portion of our expositions is correct only with “accuracy to …” Together with 
understanding of new relations between the names, even two previously equal meanings of the names, if 
they are not identical, could turn out to be different. Until now, due to historically caused limitation of our 
knowledge, we just have not noticed the difference existing between the objects: truthfulness of the 
statement, which is expressed by symbol of congruence x y , contrary to the statement, expressed by 
symbol of identity x y , and, being comprehended as different name of “the same”, depends on 
Universal of relations, in which the objects under investigation exist. That is why “variant readings in 
notions” often occur, and not only in everyday life – even the mathematicians’ perception of the relations 
between “the same objects” may differ a little in some ways. And the statement nonsense for one 
researcher could turn out for the other one not only sensible, but true. For instance, for logicians statement 
« Z is the son of childless parents X  and Y » appears to be absurd, since they imply that what is meant 
here is their biological son. But for another reader this statement is indefinite, in fact it cold refer to an 
adopted son. In such case this statement will be quite sensible and true. Absurd for the majority of 
logicians [7,8] statement “I lie” as an answer to the question “Do you lie?”, in reality is sensible but 
indefinite. For instance, statement “I lie” only on Fridays, or only to my wife has indefinite, hidden sense. 
But if the point is that “I always lie” and it means also right now, then for relations language 
 
 any statement, denying itself, is named absurd.  
 
Often outwardly nonsense statements appear in those cases, when the statement contains the names 
from different Universals of points. Thus, often cited and outwardly nonsense statement “«Caesar» is a 
prime number” proves to be quite sensible, if all the names are put in order, and their finite number 
corresponds to number N, and these numbers are put in one-to-one single-valued correspondence to 
interval of whole numbers   1N  , then statement “«Caesar» is a prime number” precisely means that name 
“Caesar” in the adopted sorting of names corresponds to a prime number. Hence,  
 
 in order for the statement to have sense, the “names” in the statement should be either from one 
Universal of points, or their Universals should be isomorphic.  
 
This is necessary, but by far not sufficient condition of the statements meaningfulness. 
 
We have already many times used the word “sense”. To our mind, for any language, and, 
consequently for all the science sub-disciplines in general this notion is principal. Even the most intricate 
linguists and philosophers can not avoid appealing to “sense”, because we write and investigate notions 
and statements, which we are able to “give sense to” and to transfer this “sense” to the other reader. More 
than that, even the most genuine formalists in mathematics, for example [9], can not avoid this “sin”, and 
not only on the stage of “tentative explanations” and formulation of axioms (definitions). Just because 
any symbolic language represents nothing more than abbreviated connected record of statements, 
comprising “tentative” explanations, where the notion of “sense” is sure to be present. But is it possible at 
all to define the notion of “sense” by means of statements, which should have this sense themselves? In 
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his review of different points of view on the notion of “sense”, both linguistic and philosophical ones, 
A.I.Novikov [10] wrote: “Sense belongs to the category of those enigmatic phenomena, which are 
considered to be commonly known, since it plays part both in academic and in ordinary communication. 
In reality, it is not only deprived of any rigorous generally accepted definition, but even on descriptive 
level there exists big spread of judgements what it means. Sometimes it is accepted, that the sense belongs 
to those most general categories, which are not subject for defining and should be perceived as some kind 
of given entity”.  
As a result it turns out that we are standing at very unsettled ground. And the question “Do we 
really understand each other?” is becoming more and more topical in our technocratic time. 
 
To our mind hopelessness of the situation is conditioned not by perceived, but just by 
“materialistic” standpoint on the goal of our research – we are still looking for “bricks” of the universe, 
i.e. the notions, using which we hope to construct the whole World. Again we are searching for the 
essences, investing them with “qualities”, “properties”, not taking into account that these notions are 
relations, but not essences. At this, using the same “bricks” it is possible to construct a prison for the brain 
or to erect a house of worship for it – everything depends on correlation between the “bricks”.  
And the “bricks” themselves, their “name that exists” – word root, its spelling is the entire world of 
relations, which reveals its richness, its many faces in prefixes, endings, contexts....  
 
And though in mathematics the name of an object-point is only a symbol from the alphabet adopted 
by us, and the math studies small fragments of speculative universe with clear boundaries, as far as 
possible, both in Universal of points and in Universal of relations between them, it is impossible to 
guarantee that somewhere in deep subconsciousness some of the relations are only implied (not 
perceived). And the “sense”, embedded in the alphabet and embodied at the stages of “preliminary 
explanations” and axioms (definitions), is concealed in proved theorem. And it could happen that some of 
the theorems are deprived of sense at all.  
So what is “sensible statement” for relations language, and what is “sense’ as such?  
 
 The sense of statement (word) is perceived entirety of relations, in which the named objects exist. 
 
That is why the sense of the statement “point y exists in relation r with point x” just consists in the 
fact that “point y exists in relation r with point x”. That is why some of the words come to life – they are 
filled with the sense new for us, while we learn more and more about their relations with the other words. 
That is why, rereading the old book, sometimes we have the feeling that we have not read it at all. It 
happens just because the Universals of relations and points, which we perceive, do not have clear 
boundaries, change all the time – new relations appear, the other, on the contrary, die away, and what was 
truth for us yesterday, today appears to be lie. Thus,  
 
 we categorize the statements, first of all, as sensible, nonsense (statements deprived of sense) and    
absurd.  
 
Absurd and nonsense statements usually differ. The first ones are perceived by us, as the 
statements, which contradict themselves, for example “I always lie”; the second ones are perceived by us 
as the statements deprived of sense, for example “If it rains, then the tram”. But in our perception of 
sense nonsense statements have no sense. Hence, they present only some part – proper subset of nonsense 
statements set. Some of nonsense statements, but by no means absurd, could become quite sensible, 
although in wider field of relations. For instance, the quoted above nonsense statement could also look 
like that: “If it rains heavily in the city, then the tram does not go along our street, located in the lowland». And so on 
and so forth. And that is why 
 
 sensible statements could be true, lying or indefinite.  
 
But speaking about indefinite statements, we have in mind not only the statements, the definition of 
which could be completed, and they will become either true, or lying, or absurd. For example, the 
statement « Z is the son of childless parents X  and Y » becomes absurd, if the definition of word “son” is 
completed by word “biological”; and it becomes true, if the word “son” definition is completed by word 
“adopted”. We also mean those statements, the definition of which could not be completed theoretically. 
Such statements often appear as infinite chain of conjunctions (r) (s) (t) ..    of statements (r), (s), (t),... , 
each finite chain of which is quite sensible and true. For the sake of example we will present often quoted 
[11] G.Cantor proof of theorem on nondenumerability of points set of unit segment E = [0.1] of real 
numbers. It is absolutely simple and very illustrative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theorem (Cantor). Points set of unit segment E = [0.1] is nondenumerable. 
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Proof. Let us assume the opposite, that this set countable: 1 2 3, , ,...E x x x { } . We select the first segment 
1s  out of E  in such a way, that it should not contain point 1x ; the second one 2 1s s  in such a way that 
it should not contain 2x ; the third one 3 2s s  in such a way that it should not contain 3x , and so forth. It 
could be done every time, as Cantor used to prove, by dividing the segments into three equal parts. In the 
overlap of the segments, imbedded one into another, i.e. 1 isi , according to Cantor and his followers 
idea, there must for sure be the point, that does not appertain to E , and this exactly proves its non-
denumerability  
 
But at this, they leave out of account, that each segment is a subset of denumerable set E according 
to assumption ex contrario, and that is why it also appears to be denumerable set. Hence, overlap 1 isi  
is not defined, i.e. it is null, because for any point out of E there exist a segment, which does not 
incorporate it. And though the theorem is true – see Section 3, the above proof is fallible.  
 
The same type infinite chains of conjunctions are not rare in mathematics. In fact, on this basis 
intuitionists thought [1] that the principle of the third element exclusion can not be a law of logic, 
overlooking that a statement could turn out to be indefinite. 
 
 In this connection we would like to draw your attention to the fact, that in mathematical theory 
existence of the statement in a form of indefinite infinite conjunctions chain in substance presents Godel 
theorem about existence in this theory of the statements, which can not be either proved, or invalidated. 
We will speak just a little later about formal facet of the logic of relations language – about formalization 
of the notion of “sense”. And we will finish the discussion by general characteristic. 
 
 For relations language declarative statements could be sensible and nonsense. Nonsense statements in 
the capacity of proper subset contain absurd statements. Sensible statements could be true, lying and 
indefinite. Under expansion of relations Universal a) some of the indefinite statements could turn either 
true, or lying, or absurd, and b) some of nonsense statements, excluding absurd ones, could turn 
sensible. 
 
Therefore, logic of the relations language will turn out to be “four-dimensional”, but not two-dimensional 
“yes/no” of classical calculus. At this, it will be as if “alive”, often changing, depending on mathematical 
theory, being developed.   
 
 
Section 2. RL-logic  
 
Designations 
 
 In RL-logic (Relations Language Logic) points and a relationship in which they exist, are marked by the 
Latin lowercase letters, but in different styles. 
Symbol  , standing in front of point x  (relation r ), means: there exists x  (respectively r ); denial 
of existence of the point (relation) is designated as  . Record ! … means singularity of the object, the 
existence of which is affirmed.  
Statement ...x implies: for each point x …, and each semi-column ... : ... – thus, (of the kind), such, 
that...  
Symbols   and   designate conjunctions and, and respectively or. 
Unless otherwise noted, the equality symbol "=" is understood as the definition of the left part of 
the statement – the part, that stands ahead of symbol "="; through the right part – the part, that follows 
symbol "=" is defined. Relation of identity, " ", unlike equality, is not changed at any extension of the 
Universals. 
In this section, for simplicity of speech, we will use the standard symbols of set theory. The 
numbering of the statements, theorems and examples is consecutive. The first digit means the section 
number; the second is the sequential number. End of examples, deductions and comments will be 
represented by the graphic symbol of the sand glass – . 
 
Basic notions 
Further on, meanings of the names – objects , , ,..x y z , their certain “field” , , ,...x y zF { } , will be 
called by us not only as points, but as primitives, by that pointing out non-definability of these notions, 
except by means of the “field” of n -ary relations r,s,t,...R= { } , in which these points exist among 
themselves. We assume relations field R= as defined and non-contradictory. Speaking about determinacy 
of R=, we imply, that each relation r  out of R= is determined in the whole field of primitives. Speaking 
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about non-contradiction of R=, we imply that in R= there is no pair of relations, which are incompatible 
with each other. We will formalize these notions thereafter. We will call dyad ,F R{ }  the object of logic. 
Speaking that point y  exists in relation r  with point x , we will write Tr( [r] )x y , stressing by lower 
symbol truthfulness of the statement (derivative from truth).  
 
 
Record Tr( [r] , ,.. )x y z{ }  means that that plurality of points , ,..y z{ }  (the sequence order of which 
and their number n are fixed by relation r ) is in relation r  with point x  ( n -ary relation). If we speak 
about lie or equivocation of the statement, we write Li( [r] , ,.. )x y z{ }  and Pr( [r] , ,.. )x y z{ } , respectively 
(derivatives from lie and primitive). When there is no need to indicate particular primitive statement, 
then, speaking about statement, we will just frame relation r , inducing it, by round or square brackets, i.e. 
we will write it in the form of (r)  or [r] .  
All the points , ,..y z{ } out of F , for which Tr( [r] , ,.. )x y z{ } , are called image of r in point x , that is 
recorded as Trr[ ] , ,.. ( [r] , ,.. )x y z x y z{ { } : { } } .  
All the points x out of F , for which image r[ ]x  is not “null”, and which is designated by symbol 
“ ”, i.е. r : r[ ]x x  I { } , is named truthfulness domain of r . And since each relation out of R  is defined 
for the whole F , then addition to rI – all the points out of r\F I  is entitled as the domain of lie. If r I is 
null, then r is called relation undefined in F .  
Grammatically properly constructed statement (r)  can have sense – be sensible Se(r) , but it can 
have no sense – be nonsense No(r) (derivatives from sense and nonsense respectively). Sensible statement 
can be true Tr(r) , lying Li(r) , or undefined Pr(r) . We will name statements (r)  and (s) equipollent and 
write (r) (s)  , if they express the same sense. Consequently, r s=I I . 
 
 
  
Example. To illustrate efficiency of the adopted symbols, let us look at the classical paradox of the “liar” 
– “I always lie”. Now we formalize this statement. We will eliminate, first of all, “I” – we do not care 
who particularly is speaking. The word “always” is equipollent to the word “any”. And the statement “I 
always lie” will be written as Li Tr[( r) ] – any statement is lying. But for relations language, to affirm 
truthfulness of lying state of things or lie of the true state of things, for example, x x , is just an absurd.  
 
 
On the other hand, sensible statement “I lie” as an answer the question “Do you lie?” is indefinite, 
but not an absurd statement, as some textbooks assume: Lir:(r) –       «something», «sometimes» and etc., 
happens to be lying  
 
Thus, we distinguish statements, first of all, as sensible and nonsense. But the notion of sensibility, 
previously formulated, should be formalized.  
 
Let R be plurality of non-contradictory relations, perceived by our mind and defined by us, in 
which primitives out of F exist. These relations are just integral to the definitions of the notions of the 
mathematical theory, which we intend to develop. That is why these relations are a priori sensible, and 
this is recorded by us as the first axiom of relations language. 
 
2.1. Axiom. Any relation of r  out of R is sensible.  
 
And since any relation r  out of R  has its own not null truthfulness field rI , then,  notion of  
determinacy of relation r consists just in this, and as addition in F , there exists lie field r\F I , so we 
come to a conclusion, that 
 
2.2. Statement. For each r  out of R  the principle of the third option exclusion is correct: 
Tr Li(r) (r) . 
 
Basing on a priori relations sensibility of field R , we will be interested to find out the conditions of 
sensibility of these relations combinations, which rely on conjunctions  , , implication symbol  ” ” 
and equivalency symbol ” ”. This is the first task of assertions logic. 
Which way relation r s should be interpreted?  
 
2.3. Definition. Relation r s , which is entitled as conjunction, is understood as plurality of statements 
type: ( [r s] , ,.. ) ( [r] , ,.. ) ( [s] , ,.. )x y z x y z x y z    { } { } { }  
 
Here symbols , ,    signify one of the symbols Tr,Li,Pr,Ab . Let us look at it more in details. Each 
of the statements, comprising the right part, is induced by sensible relations r  and s . That is why indices 
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,   can acquire the only valuations Tr  and Li . In set s r I I I  of conjunction truthfulness, if it is not 
null,      Tr . In the other points the statement is lying. If I is null, then, disregarding whatsoever 
set s r\( )F\ I I could be, we will always deal with either indefinite, or absurd statement. 
 
2.4. Example. Hereinafter in all the examples F N will mean a set of natural numbers. We will mean by 
record /m k ,that mN  is divided by kN  without remainder. 
 
 
 
1. Let us consider two binary relations:  
 
 
 
 
( [r] ) [( ) ( / 2)]m n n m m   , ( [s] ) [( ) ( / 3)]m n n m m   . 
 
 
 
 
 
These are two sensible statements. The first one defines the numbers, which are divisible by 2, the 
second one – those, which are divisible by 3. Truthfulness domains of these statements do not coincide, 
though they overlap. Now let us consider compound statement (r) (s) : 
 
( [r s] ) ([ ] [( / 2) ( / 3)])m n n m m m     . 
 
 
 
  It is also sensible, it defines the numbers, which are divisible by 2 and by 3.  
2. Let us have a look at two binary relations  
 
( [p] ) ([ ] [( 1) 0])nm n n m     , ( [q] ) ([ ] [( 1) 0])nm n n m     . 
 
These are two sensible statements. The first one defines odd numbers, and the second one – even 
numbers. Their truthfulness domains do not coincide and do not crosscut. And here comes compound 
statement  
 
( [p q] ) [( ) ([( 1) 0] [( 1) 0])]n nm n n m         , 
 
which is not only not defined (has null truthfulness domain), but at the same time it is absurd, since one of 
the parts of the sentence refuses the second one. And that is what we mean by absurdity. We have to point 
out, that in standard calculus for any “formulas” p  and q  expression for p q  is also considered to be 
“formula”. For relations language, as we see, it is not always the case  
 
That is why we will assume the following in the capacity of the second axiom of relations language 
logic: 
 
2.5. Axiom. Relation r s is sensible, if and only if r s I I . 
 
 
 
 
Truss   makes it possible to give definition of non-contradiction of field R : Tr Tr Lir,s:[(r) (s) ]  .  
 
2.6. Definition. Relation r s , which is called disjunction, is understood as plurality of the statements 
type: ( [ ]{ , ,..}) ( [ ]{ , ,..}) ( [ ]{ , ,..})x r s y z x r y z x s y z      
 
 
 
 
2.7. Example. Relations r,s  and p,q  are the same as in 2.4. Both statement  
1. ( [r s] ) ([ ] [( / 2) ( / 3)])m n n m m m     , 
and statement  
2. ( [p q] ) [( ) ([( 1) 0] [( 1) 0])]n nm n n m          
have univalent sense. It seems to be impossible to make nonsense statement with conjunction “or”. But 
why then both statement [12] 
3. « 2 2 4  », or “New York is a big city”, 
and statement 
4. « 2 2 5  », or “New York is a big city”, 
which are absurd for common sense, prove to be true in classic logic?  
Let us formalize these statements. In set of natural numbers statements 2 2 4   and   2 2 5   are 
induced by relation t( )k  type: ( [t( )] ) ( )m k n n m k   , where 4,5k . Then, t(4) 1,2,4I { } , and 
t(5) 1,5I { } . 
Let us formalize statement “New York is a big city”. By word “big” or “small” we will mean, for 
instance, the area nameS of the city ( )name  up to the city boundaries. The number of the cities on Earth is 
finite; let it be N . That is why isomorphism f exists between subset of natural numbers :k k NZ = { } , 
and  set of the cities, arranged in the order of increasing of  the areas they occupy, i.e. k l  result in 
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k lS S . Let us split Z  into three non-overlapping sequential parts, which will be designated as 1Z , 21Z  
and 31Z . If 1kZ , then the cities complying with these values of k  will be called “small”; the cities with 
2k 1Z  will be called “medium”. And the cities with 3k 1Z  will be called “big”. Let us assume,  
( [v( )] ) [( ) ( )]m n n m n     Z , с v( )  ZI . 
Relation t( ) v( )k    is quite sensible in :k k NZ = { } , with non-null truthfulness domain. But, in view 
of definition 2.6, example 2.7.3 will be recorded like this: (2[t(4)]2) (2[v(3)]2) . But, obviously, New 
York holds not the second number in the cities classification with respect to their areas, and 
statement (2[v(3)]2)  turns to be lying, but not true, as it is affirmed in statement 2.7.3. That is why the 
second part of sentence 2.7.3 will be recorded like this: Li Tr((2[v(3)]2) ) . But, as we mentioned before, the 
statements of this kind are absurd. The same way, in example 2.7.4 we have (2[t(5)]2) (2[v(3)]2) . But 
its first part is lying, the second is absurd.  
Here the reason is revealed, due to which statements 2.7.3-4 are really absurd, though they are true 
in classic logic. Example 2.7.3 is built up in the following way. Its first part « 2 2 4  » is taken from 
domain t(4)I of truthfulness t(4) , and the second part – “New York is a big city” is tаken from domain 
v(3)I of truthfulness v(3) with   t(4) v(3) I I . And these two randomly selected statements were united 
by conjunction “or” in contravention with definition 2.6   
 
The possibility of existence of statements, contradicting common sense, the statements appearing 
due to conjunction “or” and implication (see below), at its early stage really perplexed the minds of 
logicians to big extent [12,13]. But, without solving this problem, they just “turned a blind eye to it”. We 
are solving this problem having defined all the elements of the truss in one field of primitives (or 
isomorphic fields), and by calculating according to definition 2.6. That is why we accept the following as 
the third axiom of relations language:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8. Axiom. For any r ,s  out of R  relation r s  is sensible.  
 
 
 
 
2.9. Definition. Relation r s , which is read “if (r) , then (s) ” and called implication, is understood as 
plurality of statements type:  
    ( [ ]{ , ,..}) ( [ ]{ , ,..}) ( [ ]{ , ,..})x r s y z x r y z x s y z     . 
 
 
Due to determinacy of r  and s  indices ,   acquire only valuations Tr or Li . And since we are 
interested only in true implications, we have to find out, under which conditions index   acquires 
valuation Tr .  
We should mention, that, if Tr Tr(r) (s) , then rI should coincide with sI ; otherwise in some subset 
of true values of (r) statement (s) can turn out to be lying, and in some subset of lying values of   
(r) statement (s)  will remain true. That is why condition r sI I is necessary condition for the implication 
to be true. Analogous considerations show, that, if Li Li(r) (s)  is true implication, then r s\ \F I F I  
should take place, which is again tantamount to r sI I . Whenever Li Tr(r) (s) , we get s r\I F I .   
The above three types of statements are referred to true implications. 
 
2.10. Example. F N . Let 
( [r] ) [( ) ( / 2)]m n n m m   , ( [p] ) ([ ] [( 1) 0])nm n n m     ,         ( [q] ) ([ ] [( 1) 0])mm n n m     . 
 
1. Implication r p  is true with r pI I , both in set of even numbers, then Tr Tr(r) (p) , and in set of 
odd numbers, then Li Li(r) (p)  
 
2. Implication r q  с r qI I  is also true: а) if  n m , then Tr Tr(r) (q) ; b) if n m , then 
Li Tr(r) (q) ; c) if n m , then Li Li(r) (q)  
 
When truthfulness of (r)  results in lie of (s) , we get r s\I F I . In standard calculus statements 
Tr Li(r) (s)  are a priori referred to lying implications, which is not always the case. 
 
2.11. Example. F N . Let 
( [r] ) [( ) ( / 2)]m n n m m    и ( [q] ) ([ ] [( 1) 0])nm n n m     . 
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Let us consider implication q r , i.e. ([ ] [( 1) 0]) [( ) ( / 2)]nn m n m m        . In subset of odd 
numbers implication Tr Li(q) (r)  is true, since it affirms that, if “ n  is an odd number” is true, then “ n  is 
divisible by 2 without remainder” is lying. In subset of even numbers implication Li Tr(r) (q) is also true, 
affirming, that, if “ n is an odd number” is lying, then “ n  is divisible by 2 without remainder” is true     
We see that there are no grounds, except for apriori ones, to consider implication Tr Li(r) (s)    
undoubtedly lying – everything depends on correlations between rI and sI . That is why we adopt the 
following as the fourth axiom: 
 
2.12. Axiom. Relation r s    is sensible, if and only if r sI I , or s r\I F I r s( \ )I F I .  
 
The relations, which do not comply with the above axioms, have no sense for relations language, 
i.e. they are nonsense statements.  
 
2.13. Example. F N . Let us look at the relations:         
 
 
 
1. ( [p] ) ([ ] [( 1) 0])nm n n m     , ( [t(4)] ) ( 4)m n n m   .  
Can any kind of implication do exist between them?  In standard calculus it can without any doubt. In 
relation logic it can not, since p 2,4,6,...I { }  and t 1,2,4I { } , and axiom 3.12 is not fulfilled. That is 
why any implication between these relations has no sense. 
                 
 2. In standard calculus type “if 2 > 3, then 138 is a prime number”, is true assertion. We formalize 
this statement in F N . Subset of prime numbers will be designated as Dn. Statements type 2 > 3 are 
brought to existence by relation ( [w] ) ( )m n m n  , with image w[ ] 1,2,..., 1m m { }  and truthfulness 
domain equal to w \ 1NI { } . Statement “138 is a prime number” is generated by relation 
( [d] ) [( ) ( )]m n n m n   D , with truthfulness domain dI Dn. It is clear, that axiom 2.12 is not fulfilled, 
and consequently “if 2 > 3, then 138 is a prime number” is nonsense statement.     
 
             3. In standard calculus statements type “if 2 > 3, then New York is a big city” are true assertions, but 
they are absurd in RL-logic. In order to make sure in this, it is necessary to model reflections from 2.7.  
 
2.14. Definition. Relations r,s  are called equivalent and recorded r s , if and only if  Tr Tr(r s) (s r)   , 
which is understood as plurality of statements type: 
 
( [ ]{ , ,..}) [( [ ]{ , ,..}) ( [s] , ,.. ) ] [( [s] , ,.. ) ( [r] , ,.. ) ]x r s y z x r y z x y z x y z x y z        { } { } { }  
  
Verbal proof, analogous to that, which we pursued when investigating one-sided implication, show, 
that index   Tr  in case and only in case, when r sI I , both for   Tr , and for   Li . Then we say, 
that statements (r)  and (s)  are equipollent.  
 
2.10.1 gives us an example of equivalent relations and equipollent statements; 2.10.2 and 2.13 are 
the examples of inequivalent relations. 
 
We pay attention, that identity sign “  ” is not tantamount equivalency sign “ ”. Relations 
( [r] ) [( ) ( / 2)]m n n m m    and ( [p] ) ([ ] [( 1) 0])nm n n m      are equivalent, but a priori are not 
identical.  
 
To affirm lie of true statement and truthfulness of lying one is absurd. It is possible to convince 
oneself in this by direct calculation. 
 
2.15. Statement. Statements Tr Li((r) ) and Li Tr((r) ) have no sense. 
Proof. Let us look at the first statement. Since Tr Li Tr Li((r) )) (r) (r)  , then, assuming that  Tr Li(s) (r)  
with s r\I F I , we get r s r r\   I I I F I , which contradicts axiom 2.5. And since 
Tr Li Li Tr(r) (r) (r) (r)   , we get the proof for the second part of the statement  
 
Relations field structure 
 
 
 
 Now we will discuss the issue about structure of field R . First of all, we should note, that the 
principle of the third option exclusion is fulfilled for any point r  of field R . And, consequently, it should 
be fulfilled also for any element equivalent to r . That is why, in future, by r we will imply its 
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equivalence class. Hereinafter for any given conjunctions chain r s t ...    the principle of the third 
option exclusion will also be fulfilled. This principle is also applicable to r s t...   It follows that such 
kind of relations can be the elements of field R , and let us add them to it. But implication r s  is 
external relation over field R . It can also be absurd. That is why such kind of relations can not be the 
elements of field R .  
In field R there can be relations, represented just in a form of infinite chain of conjunctions. If 
z I , then it means lie of statement (z) in the whole field of primitives. And these are indefinite 
statements, which are not available in field R  by definition. If z I , then either T r(z) , or Li(z) take 
place. That is why for field R the principle of the third option exclusion is fulfilled without any limits. 
But field R  can not be considered complete, since there could be a chain of conjunctions, the limit of 
which has null field of truthfulness. 
 
 
 
Extension of field R , for example, perception of new relations can also lead to extension of 
plurality of sensible statements – some of previously nonsense statements will turn sensible. It gives all 
the grounds to assume, that logic will never be able to become completed theory and will forever remain a 
“stepchild” of ever developing mathematics. 
 
The laws of logic 
 
 
In standard calculus (including intuitionists) the following assertions are considered to be the laws 
of logic, arising from definition of the respective trusses, in particular: 
 
С1. r,s [(r s) (r)]   ; r,s [(r s) (s)]   . 
 
С2. r,s [(r) (s r)]   ; r,s [(s) (s r)]   . 
 
С3. (r) [( s) (r)]   . 
 
С4. (r) [(r) ( s)]   . 
 
С5. r,s [(r) (s)] [(s) (r)]    . 
 
Let us consider assertions С1. In compliance with 2.5, sensibility condition for the left part of 
statement (r s) (r)  is r s I I . Then, in compliance with 2.12, sensibility condition for implication 
between the assertions will be condition r s rI I I , which in reliance on the second statement С1 
produces the following: r sr,s I I . But for random relations this condition is unsatisfiable. That is why 
for relations language С1 can not act as a logic law. 
 
Let us consider assertions С2, which seem to be quite compelling. The area of true values of  s r  
will be designated as I . Then, the condition for truthfulness of implication r s r  , in accordance with 
2.12, can only be r I I . The other possibilities are excluded, since in the right part of the implication 
the same relation as in the left part is present. It instantly results in r sI I . Analogous reasoning for the 
second implication С2 produces r sI I , and that is why the binding condition of С2 truthfulness is r sI I . 
But it is impossible for random relations r,s . 
Let us consider assertion С3, which sounds pretty strange in colloquial language: true assertion 
proceeds from any assertion. Then, on account of axiom 2.12, we find the following conditions for 
implication truthfulness: Tr,Li Tr( s) (r)  : either r ss I I , or  r ss \ I F I , which is impossible for 
random s . Hence, С3 also can not be regarded as a law of logic. 
Analogous verbal proofs show, that both С4, and С5 contradict axiom 2.12. That is why we can 
adopt only the following in the quality of the laws of logic of relations language (generality quantifier is 
not specified, but implied): 
 
R1. of identity: (r) (r) . 
R2. of the third option exclusion: T r Li(r) (r) . 
R3. of absurdity: Tr Li Ab([(r) ] ) , Li Tr Ab([(r) ] ) . 
R4. of double negation: Li Li Tr((r) ) (r) . 
R5. of contraposition: Tr Tr Li Li(r) (s) (s) (r)   . 
R6. of Morgan: Li Li Li(r s) (r) (s)   , Li Li Li(r s) (r) (s)   . 
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R7. of transitivity Tr Tr Tr(r s) (s t) (r t)     . 
 
About deductions 
 
 
 
In contrast to deductions [14,15] of classical calculus, we do not distinguish between the notions of 
“implication” (implication – consequence, conclusion) and “sequent” (sequence – succession), though the 
difference in conceptual sense of expressions “if (r) , then (s) ” and, respectively, “ (s) arises from (r) ” 
formally exists due to ill-defined “if”. But since each true implication in relations language always begins 
more specifically – either      Tr(r) , or Li(r) , then this conceptual difference disappears. 
In reference to the notion of “formulas deducibility” according to the rule modus ponens and 
synthesis, which are systematically used in predicates calculus, then for relations language these are 
nothing more than tautologies. For example, modus ponens is recorded this way: (r) [(r) (s)] (s)   .  
What is theorem (any) for relations language? It is nothing more than new plurality of relations in 
F , in sensibility of which we would like to make sure. That is why the deduction itself of the truthfulness 
(falsehood) of some kind of statements – theorem (hypothesis) in relations language always represents 
some transitive-reflexive relation over field R, generated by implications plurality. Naturally, this chain of 
logisms is based on definitions of logic trusses, generality and existential quantifiers, as well as logical 
laws. And, consequently 
 
 
 
 each proved theorem and its conclusions, in  essence, present existing, but previously not perceived by 
us relations in F .  
 
By this, the development of the theory of proofs is equally matched to development of the theory of 
partially ordered structures and does not have solution perspective – there will be nothing to say except 
for general phrases. The author hopes to discuss the elements of theory of proofs in special study. But we 
would like to highlight some issues right now.  
The proof of theorem (t)  truthfulness may require proof of intermediate statement, we will say   (z) . 
In its turn, it may require consideration of infinite chain of conjunctions: (z) (r) (s) ...    If it turns 
out that z I , then such statement is not defined. But any implication Pr Tr(z) (t) , by reason of axiom 
2.12, is absurd, and that is why theorem Tr(t)  is unprovable. In Section 1 we made an example of fallible 
reasoning of this kind, though there are much more of them. 
 
The other important thing is that in proofs “by contradiction” we assume lie of some statement Li(t) . 
Later one strives to demonstrate, that it ends in conclusion about lie of a fortiori truthful statement Tr(s) , 
i.e. results in absurd: Li(t) ...  Tr Li... ((s) ) .  From here the conclusion is drawn, that the statement is 
true – Tr(t) . But in the process of deduction, at some intermediate stage truss Tr Tr(p) (q)  may appear with 
p q FI I . Here the implication chain may terminate. Hence Tr(t) is unprovable. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
Any symbolic language is nothing more than concise presentation of statements, bound by the laws 
of statements logic. But if different people even to small extent, but differently percept the sense of these 
statements, then, about what “strict language” can we talk, if the sense is not defined? And in this respect 
Gilbert program was doomed to failure from the very beginning. But the main thing lies in the fact, that 
the notion of “true” statement is only one of the three hypostasis of the notion of “sensible” statement.  
Formal theory of sense, narrated above, is based only on a priori sensibility of the “primary” 
relations out of field R . Why we so “easily” agreed to that? Just because affirmative statement “point y 
exists in relation r  with point x” exactly means its sensibility. And then, the only thing remaining for us 
was to investigate the conditions of sensibility of relations received out of field R  by means of trusses 
, , ,    . And these things are revealed in the same field of primitives F (or isomorphic fields).  
It instantly leads to the situation, when we are not able to unify operations , , ,     in a form of 
“truthfulness tables” for random sensible relations  r  and s  . And moreover, we can not unify the 
operation of negation r , which initially was not introduced, because for relations language it is indefinite 
statement: in fact “not r ”, means “some other relation”. As a result, it is impossible to narrow down 
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formal theory of sense to any kind of plurality of “algebraic” rules due to axioms 2.5,12. Logic is 
converted into “topological” matter with “algebraic” suspension. In this connection 
 
 building-up of any kind of mathematical theory after defining the field of primitives and relations, in 
which they exist, requires construction of the accompanying logic of assertions.  
 
 
Section 3. Theory of sets in RL-logic 
 
According to George Cantor “The set is coufounding of particular different objects of our intuition 
or of our brainwork into one integral. These objects are called the points of obtained set”. But after 
paradoxes of the theory of sets were found, a great deal of researchers of the end of the XIX and the 
beginning of the XX century started looking for more satisfactory definition of the theory of sets (see, for 
instance[16]). And in the first quarter of the ХХ century the standpoint was formed, which is also being 
“professed” nowadays [16,17], that the notion of the “set” should be defined through undefinable 
pertaining relation: “ X is a set in the case and only in the case, if :Y X Y  ”. But this is not 
definition of the set, but additional condition in the definition, which was never formulated, and which 
enables to avoid serious paradoxes, and to preserve the property of the set to be a member of “something 
else”. Maybe, that is why, upon sufferance from all sides, A.V. Arkhangelskiy has written [18]: “The 
experience of present-day mathematics and analysis of its foundations show, that the sets are that basic 
elementary material, out of which all the main mathematical objects are constructed”. And that: “…there 
exist all grounds to consider the idea of sets one of the most crucial and the most primary forms of 
thinking”. 
Intuitive-descriptive approach to the notion of the set is preserved in investigations of the past 
decades – in the alternative theory of sets developed by P.Vopenko [19]. 
But not only for the researchers, but also for the historians of science the other point of view on the 
notion of the “set” remained unnoticed, and which was formulated by Poincare at the beginning of the XX 
century [4]: “To define a set always means to make classification, to isolate the subjects, which belong to 
this set, from those which do not participate in it”. In other words, for Poincare the notion of the “set” is 
the classification of Universal of points by some relation.  
Such opinion about the notion of the “set” naturally followed Poincare’s philosophical view on 
cognitive essence of the science. Let us remind that: “The fact is that it [science] is able to cognize not the 
essence of a thing, as naive dogmatists think, but only the relations between the things; beyond these 
relations there is no cognizable reality”. 
Many Poincare’s coevals, especially G.Weyl [20], brought out superficially close opinions on the 
notion of the set “Nobody can describe infinite set differently than, having specified the properties, 
intrinsic for the elements of this set; ... Conceptualization of infinite set as a kind of plurality, composed 
by means of infinity of separate arbitrary selection actions, and contemplated later by our consciousness 
as something integral, is devoid of sense;“inexhaustibility” is embedded just in the essence of infinity”. 
Similar thing was said also by Bourbaki [21]: “The set is formed by the elements, capable of having some 
properties and exist among themselves or with the elements of the other sets in some kind of relations”. 
But, according to Bourbaki, the “set” is always a “member” of the other set. 
 
 
In theory of sets relation is some subset of Cartesian product of sets; and in relations language it is 
just set, which represents classification, or, sometimes we will say, Universal points filtration by some 
relation. But it turned out, that even such simple shift of emphasis results in substantial differences with 
the results of theory of sets. Fortunately, practically all these differences lie in “ultramundane” domains of 
the mathematics.   
 
Basic notions 1)  
Let us fix certain relation i .  
 
3.1 Definition. All the points of Universal F , for which Tr( [i ] )x x , are called plurality (set) X of points 
in terms of  i , and recorded as: Tr: ( [i ] )X x x x { } .  
___________________________ 
 
 
 
1) Giving an account of the fundamentals of RL-theory of sets, we, in order not to refer the reader to the respective literature all 
the time, in our comments and footnotes we will reveal interrelation with axiomatic approach by Zermelo-Fraenkel [13] in theory 
of sets (ZF-theory).  
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It means, that we just indicate those points x of  Universal F , for which statement ( [i ] )x x  is true. 
They are these singled out points, which we call the set 1) . 
Pertaining relation “” becomes dependent notion: truthfulness (lie) of statement [ ]x X  is 
determined by truthfulness (lie) of statement ( [i ] )x x , i.e. Tr,Li Tr,Li[ ] ( [i ] )x X x x    
Relation i , reflexive properties of which determine set  X , will be called identifier of this set. 
Identifier i is defined only in the case, if on the visible horizon of Universal of points 
Tr: ( [i ] )x x x . Otherwise we can not know anything about it. That is why for relations language it is 
impossible to define “null-set” by statement Tr: ( [i ] )X x x x  { } , it just means, that identifier is not 
defined.  
 
 
3.2. Commentary. The concept of set, “which does not contain any elements”, plays in ZF-theory 
fundamental but not auxiliary part, and it is defined in the following way: :x x x { }   
 
But for relations language, as we said before, the relations between “something” and “nothing” do 
not exist, and consequently the notion “null-set” does not exist too. But this is philosophy. However, in 
RL-logic the problem is solved in a pretty simple way: predicate ( )x x  is given by Tr Li[( ) ]x x , and 
consequently it is not absurd. Therefore, 
 
3.3. Statement. In RL-theory of sets, null-set does not exist as an object. 
 
Identifier i can also be such, that plurality Tr: ( [i ] )X x x x x    { ! } { } will incorporate one point. 
But in RL-logic the notions of “point” and “single-point set” coincide, since they express the same 
statement: Tr! : ( [i ] )x x x .  
 
3.4. Comment. In this connection usual for mathematicians objects type , , ,x x x{ { } { { } } ..}  loose their 
sense, as well as axiom of infinity 2)  of ZF-theory  
Equality of two sets in ZF-theory is defined by axiom of equal volume (extensionality) 3) . For 
relations language it is done through RL-equivalency. 
 
3.5 Comment. Sets X  and X   are called equal and we write X X  , if and only if 
Tr,Li Tr,Li( [i ] ) ( [i ] )x x x x x   . 
 
In other words: the sets are equal, if their identifiers are RL-equivalent. 
For the sake of completeness let us consider now sets manipulations. 
 
3.6 Definition.  
    1.  Set Tr Tr: ( [i ] ) ( [i ] )X X x x x x x     { } is called unification of sets X and     X  . 
    2. Set of points ,X  which do not belong to X , i.e. Tr Li\ : ( [i ] ) ( [i ] )X X x x x x x    { }  is called 
complement of set X  up to set X  . 
   3.   Set Tr Tr:( [i ] ) ( [i ] )X X x x x x x     { } is called overlap of sets X and X  .  
   4. Set X  is called subset of set  X   and is recorded as X X  , if Tr Tr( [i ] ) ( [i ] )x x x x x   . If at 
this      \X X   , we write X X  . 
 
It could be the situation, when sets X  and X   do not have common points: 
Tr Tr: ( [i ] ) ( [i ] )x x x x x   , i.e. overlap could be null; then we write X X   .  
To define plurality of sets IX { } means to predetermine plurality of identifiers i I { } ; here I – 
is some indices, enabling us to perceive the differences between the identifiers, which we will always 
designate as by letter « i ».  
 
___________________________ 
 
1) Definition 4.1 differ from axiom ZF-V of isolation of sub-sections of ZF-theory particularly by analyzing identifier in the 
whole Universal of points, but not only in the “previously” isolated sets.  
 
2) Axiom ZF-VII. «There exists, at least, one set X , having the following properties: a) X  , b) if x X , 
then x x X { } ». 
The first part of axiom has no sense for us, and the second one is tautology, since x x x { }  
3) Axiom ZF-I. «The sets, consisting of the same elements, are equal».  
 
 13
3.7. Comment. But such element as “set [ ]XP , the members of which are all kinds of subsets of set X ” 
will not appear in RL-logic. Illusiveness of such structures of sets theory dramatically become apparent in  
identifiers medium: in the event of “all kinds of subsets”, unification of any sub-plurality of identifiers 
coincides with some identifier from original plurality: i [ i ]I I    { } P { } . That is why for relations 
language Cantor theorem [ ] [ [ ]]X Xm < m P  about potencies, where [ ]Xm  means potency of plurality X  
in ZF in his understanding is unprovable in principle. Moreover, in the proof of this theorem (see [22], p. 
29), when demonstrating the existence of inconsistent set, ill-defined statement ( [r] )x  is used  
Hereinafter we will omit identifiers symbols in the instances, when there is be no special need for 
that. 
The operations of overlapping, unification and taking the complement have the following, 
practically invisible properties, which are lumped in a form of theorem for convenience of references and 
with the purpose of completeness. 
 
 
3.8. Theorem. Let ZYX ,, be random sets.  
1. X Y Y X   и X Y Y X  . 
 
 
2. ( ) ( )X Y Z X Y Z    ; ( ) ( )X Y Z X Y Z    . 
3. ( ) ( ) ( )X Y Z X Y X Z     ; ( ) ( ) ( )X Y Z X Y X Z     . 
4. \ ( \ )X X Y X Y  . 
 
We also give without any proof de Morgan formulas, adduced below. 
 
3.9. Theorem. \ : \ :Y X I Y X I     { } { } ; \ : \ :Y X I Y X I     { } { } . 
 
 
                   Asserting that set Y  exists in relation  r  with set X , we will write [r]X Y . The plurality of 
those y Y , for which statement ( [r] )x y  is true, is called image of relation r  in point Xx , and is 
recorded as Trr[ ] : ( [r] )x y Y x y { } . The plurality of points out of X , for which r[ ]x is not null, is 
called domain of definition of r , and  r[ ]X – range of values inY .  
         Speaking, that set Y  is in relation r with set X , we will imply that, if otherwise is not stated, that 
domain of r  definition is the whole set X . 
And the last thing: relation s  is called inverse to r  and is designated as -1r , if 
Tr Tr, ( [r] ) ( [s] )x y x y y x   . 
 
Let r,s be some relations of set Y  with respect to set X . Congruence r s  means r[ ] s[ ]x x  for 
each point out of X ; the same way injection r s is also defined, which implies r[ ] s[ ]x x  in each 
point of the domain of definition (at least in one point r[ ]x   is proper subset of s[ ]x ). In those cases, when 
injection r s does not refuse congruence, we will write r s . Unification of two relations r  and s  is 
the name for relation r s , the image of which in each point out of X means just unification of 
images (r s)[ ] r[ ] s[ ]x x x  ; the same way the overlap of relations r s is defined, as overlap of images 
of r  and  s : (r s)[ ] r[ ] s[ ]x x x  .  
 
Let [s]X Y  and [r]Y Z  be some relations between sets X , Y , Z . Composition of relations of r and 
s  is the relation, designated as r s , with image  
 
s[ ](r s)[ ] r[ ] : s[ ] r[ ]y xx y y x y    { } , 
 
the area of definition of which due to accepted agreements coincide with X ; the composition is 
associative by definition. If X Y Z  , then the composition is called commutative under condition 
r s s r  .  
We totalize relations algebra, arising directly from the definitions, in the following form 
3.10. Theorem. Let r,s,t  be relations, ,X Y  – sets. 
1. 1 1 1 1 1(r ) r ; (r s) s r       . 
2. r (s t) (r s) t; (r s)[ ] r[s[ ]]X X      . 
3. r[ ] r[ ] r[ ]; r[ ] r[ ] r[ ]X Y X Y X Y X Y      
 
 
 
 
We will distinguish between two types of relations. Relation [r]X Y is called algebraic (mapping, 
translation invariant operator, or function – depending upon the context) and recorded in a form of  
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r : X Y , if for each x  out of X  there exists unique element y  out of Y and such, that r[ ]y x ; and it 
is called multilingual, or topologic if not.  
 
 
For two mappings there are specific names reserved. Mapping id :X X X is called constant map 
on X  (identical on X ), if id [ ]X x x  for each x X ; relation pr :X X Y  is called primitive on X  (ill-
defined on X ),      if pr [ ]X x   for x X .  
 
 
The notion of primitive relation is introduced in particular because in relations language unprovable 
statements explicitly appear. They arise also in those cases, when overlap of relations plurality, each of 
which has the same domain of definition, is primitive in each point out of the domain of definition: 
r [ ] pr[ ]x x   . 
 
Mapping f : X Y  is called surjective  (mapping “on”), if 1f f idY
  ; иinjective (mapping “in”), 
if 1f f id X
  ; bijectie, or one-to-one, if it is injective and surjective. 
 
3.11. Statement. Let 0 1 2X X X   and 0 2f : X X be bijective mapping. Then, there exists bijection 
0 1g : X X . 
Proof. In 0X  there exist subsets Y  and such, that  
 
0 1\ f[ ]Y X X Y  { } .                                                              (*) 
 
The example could be the set itself 0X : 0 0 1 0 0 1 2\ f[ ] \X X X X X X X  { } { } . Let us look at 
overlapping of all sets, complying with (*), i.e. 0Y Y  . Then, antecedent (*) for this set reverts to 
congruence 0 0 1 0\ f [ ]Y X X Y= { } , and in particular because there exist sets, for which injection (*) is 
realized in reverse direction ; for example, for 2X  we have: 2 0 1 2\ f [ ]X X X X { } . Further, noticing, 
that by reason of 3.9 there is congruence 0 0 1 0\ \ f[ ]X Y X Y= , we easily find required bijection 
0 1g : X X : 
0 0
0
id[ ], \
g[ ]
f [ ],
x x X Y
x
x x Y

 

   
 
 
This statement is instantly followed by famous theorem by Shroder-Bernstein, which plays 
important part not only in theory of sets, but also in theory of relations. 
 
3.12. Theorem (Shroder-Bernstein).       Let the following be in existence: bijective mapping p of set X on 
some subset of set ,Y and bijective mapping q  of set Y  on some subset of set X . Then there exists 
bijection h : X Y . 
Proof. Assuming 0X X , 1 q[ ]X Y , 2 q p[ ]X X  , f q p  , and using statement 3.11, we find the 
required bijection h : X Y  
 
For pre-images of mappings there exist certain correlations 
 
3.13. Theorem. Let f : X Y  and YQP , . Then 
1. 1 1 1f [ \ ] f [ ] \ f [ ].P Q P Q    
2. 1 1 1f [ ] f [ ] f [ ].P Q P Q     
3. 1 1 1f [ ] f [ ] f [ ].P Q P Q     
 
Plot оf mapping f : X Y  stands for set (f )Gr , comprising pairs ( , f[ ])x x . Any mapping is 
unequivocally characterized by its plot. 
 
We will say, that mapping g , defined in some subset    P X ,   represents exposition of mapping f , 
if for all  Px , g[ ] f[ ]x x  takes place. In this case, (f ) (g)Gr Gr . In compliance with this, we will 
say, that  f  is dilatation of g . 
 
Let X  be some set, and speaking about points , ,x y ,z ... we will imply points out of X . Our 
attention will be concentrated on relation [r]X X . 
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3.14. Definition. Relation [r]X X  is called 
       1. Reflexive, if Tr( [r] )x x x   
       2. Symmetric, if Tr Tr, ( [r] ) ( [r] )x y x y y x     
       3. Transitive, if Tr Tr Tr, , ( [r] ) ( [r] ) ( [r] )x y z x y y z x z    
       4. Equivalence relation, if it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive.  
 
And such relations, starting from Section 4, will play a leading part, which rely on their well-known 
feature to break down the sets into non-overlapping equivalence classes.  
 
3.15. Theorem. Let r  be equivalence relation on X . Then, for any two points x  and y  sets r[ ]x  and 
r[ ]y  either do not coincide, or do not overlap. 
Proof. Let us assume the contrary, that sets r[ ]x  and  r[ ]y  do not coincide, but have one common point, 
let us say z . But then, due to transitiveness, any point out of r[ ]x  also appertain to r[ ]y , and 
consequently, r[ ] r[ ]x y , which by virtue of symmetric property and reflexivity brings congruence. 
Hence r[ ]x  and r[ ]y  coincide, if they at least have one common point  
 
If r  is the relation of equivalence on X , we may consider new set /r[ ]X X  , the elements of 
which are equivalence classes r[ ]x x  and which is called factor set, and the process of transfer to factor 
set itself is called factorization of X  with respect to r . 
 
We should point out that, if  r  is equivalence relation on X , and for each other relation s , defined 
on X , r s  is true, then we do not have any possibility to distinguish between point x   and its 
equivalence class r[ ]x x  . That is why any object x  looks like point, until the relation is not found, 
which will “split” equivalence class into “different” points. 
 
Not less substantial part in the future will be played by transitive-reflexive relations. Speaking 
about transitive-reflexive relations (in the event of need to point it out, we will write s

), we will always 
imply, that it does not contain any equivalence relation, except for trivial one, or that respective set 
factorization is exercised with regard to this equivalence relation.  
 
3.16. Definition. Set   sX , with predetermined transitive-reflexive relation s

in it, is called  
      1. Partially s -ordered.  
      2. Normally s -ordered, if Tr Tr, : (s[ ] s[ ]) (s[ ] s[ ])x y z z x z y     . 
      3. Linear s -ordered, if Tr Tr, : (s[ ] s[ ]) (s[ ] s[ ])x y x y y x    . 
In compliance with stated above, we will assert that “ y rank over x ” and record y x , if and only 
if s s\ s[ ] \ s[ ]X y X x . Conformable to this we will speak about maximal element   in sX , if 
s[ ]  { } , and minimal element  , if ss[ ] X  . But if s: s[ ] X   , then     , and the plurality 
of such elements  { }  will be called root elements (we have changed to some extent generally accepted 
terminology for more adequate to relations language).   
We will call two random elements s,x y X  out of partially s -ordered set as comparable, if 
Tr Tr(s[ ] s[ ]) (s[ ] s[ ])x y y x   ; and respectively non-comparable, if Tr Tr(s[ ] s[ ]) (s[ ] s[ ])x y y x   . 
 
 
Maximal elements, as well as root ones, could be plenty of, and all of them are non-comparable. 
 
3.17. Statement. Minimal element, if it exists, is always singular.  
 
 
Proof. Really, let   and    be two minimal elements.  Hence ss[ ] X   and ss[ ] X   . But then 
s[ ]   and s[ ]   , and that is why transitive-reflexive relation s  is symmetric in certain subset  sX , 
and consequently, incorporates nontrivial equivalence relation, which is contrary to definition of 
transitive-reflexive relation  
 
 And here comes the last out of anticipatory definitions and theorems. 
 
 
3.18. Statement. For any plurality of mutually overlapping sets IX { } there exists mapping 
f :I X , which is called choice function, and it is such, that f [ ] X   .   
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Proof. Antecedent  x X  matches Tr( [i ] )x x , and therefore ,i ix X x   , where ,i x  is defined by 
the antecedent, that , Tr! :( [i ] )xx X x x   . Now for each  I   we assign some ,i x  – it exists, though, 
maybe, it is not singular, and the only remaining thing is to assume 
, Trf [ ] : ( [i ] )xx x x x X      { }   
 
 
 
In mathematical literature statement 3.18 is called axiom of choice. For relations language the issue 
of choice function is the direct consequence of the point identifier definition. ; but the choice  has to be 
done. That is why we will still call 3.18 as the axiom of choice. 
 
3.19. Comment. Axiom of choice very often, though tacitly, was used in mathematics. But, after it was 
formulated by Zermelo, the mathematicians’ community split down the middle. Some started accepting 
this axiom without any doubt, the other started to reject the same way. And the reason was that on its 
basis Zermelo proved, that arbitrary set X  could be easily put in order – could be put in order in such a 
way, that each subset will have minimal element. In other words, it is considered proved in the theory of 
sets, that choice axiom matches, as we will say at present, Cantor axiom 1) : 
 
1. Axiom (Cantor).  For random set X there exists transitive-reflexive relation s  on X  and such, that 
: s[ ]Y X y Y y Y     . 
 
Further, complete order is easy to construct: from 3.19.1 it flows out:  1 1:s[ ]x x X  , and by reason of 
definition of transitive-reflexive relation, this element is singular and minimal. Let us consider now subset 
1\X x X . Again, due to 3.19.1 and 3.17 we easily find:  
2 2 1! :s[ ] \x x X x  . And also 1 2x x . Continuing by induction: ! : s[ ] \x x X x  
 
  { } ,..and  stating, 
where necessary, the existence of “actually infinite number”, we get, that any set could be easily put in 
order. 
 
 
 
 
But the key element of equivalency proof of choice axiom and axiom 4.19.1 (see [23], p. 28; [24], p. 
78) rely on the existence of particularly such choice function, for which f[ ] x  . And this is ill-defined 
statement. Ill-defined statement of such kind is tacitly present also in the other methods of Zemerlo 
theorem proof (see [25], p. 82-83). 
That is why we formulated Zemerlo theorem in the form of Cantor axiom – since it is particularly 
this thesis, which Cantor failed to prove, (and which he considered to be “cogitation law”), which ran 
through all the papers dedicated to theory of sets before Zemerlo’s published paper. 
Putting it the other way, it was not the axiom itself, which agitated mathematicians community (see, 
for instance, [16, 26] and the literature cited there), but “materialization” of null-set, tacitly concealed in 
the proof procedure. Moreover, axiom 3.19.1, to our mind, can not match choice axiom in concept – it 
incorporates two coherent existential quantifiers, precisely:  
 
2. Axiom (Cantor).          s :[ : s[ ] ]X Y X y Y y Y      
 
,  
 
and statement  3.18, being analyzed as axiom, has only one.  
But Cantor axiom can not also be invalidated by simply referring to impotence of our mind, which 
just is not able to find the respective transitive-reflexive relation.  
It is important to stress, that Cantor axiom makes it possible to prove the “principle of transfinite 
induction”, which plays such substantial part in the theory of sets, that one can not simply construct the 
theory of sets in the pure meaning of the word. 
 
 
 
 
3. Theorem. Let sX  be perfectly s -ordered set, each element of which is assigned to statement p[ ]x , 
from truthfulness of which for all x y  it arises, that Trp[ ]y . Then, it flows out, that Tr sp[ ]x x X  . 
Proof. Let us assume the opposite, that set s Li: p[ ]Y y X y { }  is not null. But it has minimal element, 
which we designate as y . Then for all x y  Trp[ ]x ; and this brings Trp[ ]y . Consequently Y   
___________________________________________ 
 
 
1) «The notion of well ordered set proves to be fundamental for the whole teaching of manifolds. In one of the coming papers I will 
return to what seems to me to be principal, open to many hazards and especially distinctive by its general significance – 
cogitation law, in compliance with which each strictly defined set could be shaped as well ordered set». Quoted from [22], p. 69. 
Italics are Cantor’s. 
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That is why in general case this theorem is also unprovable. But in the set of whole numbers and 
their Cartesian products in an explicit form – see 3.20.4, it is possible to indicate transitive-reflexive 
relation and of such kind, that each subset will have minimal element   
 
 
 
Hereinafter we will consider several examples of differently ordered sets. 
 
3.20. Examples.  
1. In set of congruums N there exists natural order, connected with definition of whole numbers – see 
below. We will designate transitive-reflexive relation of natural order as e . In point nN  
 
e[ ] :n m m n  { }N . 
Relying upon natural order, connected with definition of congruums and negative integers, let us 
predetermine the following transitive-reflexive relation s  in N with image 
 
s[ ] : ( 1) ( 1)n mn m m n    { }N . 
 
It is easy to deduce, that s[0]N: and s[1] 1 , and the rest of the numbers, at first even in natural order, 
and later odd in reverse order, are located between these minimal and maximal elements: 0, 2, 4, 6, … 
…7, 5, 3, 1.  
 
Set eN  is quite ordered, and sN is not: subset of odd numbers does not have minimal element. We 
can try to introduce s -minimal of all odd numbers, but s -maximal of even numbers is actually infinite 
number , which isolates even and odd numbers in sN . But in order to prove, that ( 1) 1  , we will have 
to use the principle of transfinite induction, which rests just on existence of such order in set, that each 
subset has minimal element. And this means circulus vitiosus.   
 
2. Let s 1 2 3 4, , ,x x x x  { }  and 1 1 3 4s[ ] , ,x x x x { } , 2 2 3 4s[ ] , ,x x x x { } , 4 4s[ ]x x { } . 
We see partially s -ordered set, without minimal element, with two maximal and two root elements. 
Pairs of elements 1 2,x x  и 3 4,x x  are incommensurable. 
 
3. Now [0,1]E   is interval of real numbers, Y E E   and 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2s[ , ] ( , ) : ,x x y y x y x y  { } .  
Transitive-reflexive relation s  predetermines normal order in Y : for each two different 
points 1 2( , )x x x and 1 2( , )y y y  there exists 1 2( , )z z z  and of such type, that s[ ] s[ ]z x  and 
s[ ] s[ ]z y   – Fig.1. Later, s[0,0] Y , and s[1,1] (1,1) .  
 
 
 
Fig.1.  Schematic representation of image s[ ]  in different points – darkened zones, 
including boundaries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Let us obvert square Y E E   into linearly ordered set [25]. We assume, that 1 2r s s  , where 
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2s [ , ] ( , ) : ,x x y y x y y E  { } , 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2s [ , ] ( , ) : ,x x y y x y x y  { } . 
 
For two different points ),( 21 xxx   and 1 2( , )y y y it is true, that either r[ ] r[ ]x y , or         
r[ ] r[ ]y x  – Fig.2. And also s[0,0] Y and s[1,1] (1,1) . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Schematic representation of image r[ ]x , which is darkened zone, including also 
heavy line with the point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If N is selected as co-ordinate sets, then analyzed relation linearly puts in order N N , and in each 
of its subsets minimal element will be found  
 
 18
With respect to whole numbers (see below about the numbers), the sets in the theory of relations are 
subdivided into three categories: finite, denumerable, or non-denumerable. But, first we should give one 
convenient designation: | 1,2,...,n n { }N . 
 
 
 
 
3.21. Definition. 
1. Plurality X  is called finite (infinite), if whole number n  is found (not found), and such 
number, that bijection f : |nX N  exists.  
2. Infinite plurality X is called denumerable (non-denumerable), if bijection f : X  N  exists 
(does not exist).  
 
Thereinafter we will bring forward a range of theorems, which are not only instructive, but which 
will be used in the future. Those theorems are associated with the notion of denumerability, along with 
respective changes, complying with the relations language.  
 
3.22. Theorem. Denumerable aggregate of non-crosscutting denumerable sets is denumerable. 
Proof. Let nX{ }  be denumerable plurality of non-overlapping denumerable sets. We assume, that 
,n n k
k
X x . Then, their aggregate can, for example, be recorded in the following form 
 
 
nX  1,1 2,1 1,2 3,1 2,2 1,3, , , , , ,...x x x x x x{ }  
 
 
 
( n k m  ; 2,3,4,...m  ), or in the other one, which is analogous. Now one-to-one accordance with N is 
compelling   
 
3.23. Theorem. In each non-denumerable set X  there exists denumerable subset X N . 
Proof. Let us assume that 1X X . By virtue of  3.18 there exists choice function 1f , and such function, 
that 1 1 1f [1] x X  . Let us consider set 2 1 1\X X x { }f . Further, again by virtue of  3.18, there exists 
choice function 2f , and such function, that 2 2 2f [2] x X  . Continuing in inductive manner, we will get 
injective mapping g: Xf N , which is being given by rule: g[ ] f [ ]nn nf . Image g[ ] Xf N is a 
denumerable subset  
 
3.24. Theorem. Let X  be non-denumerable, and YN – denumerable sets. There exists bijection 
f : X Y X N . 
Proof. Because of 3.23 let us isolate denumerable subset X N out of X . Then   
 
( \ ) ( \ ) ( )X Y X X X Y X X X Y     N N N N N N N  
 
 
 Because of  3.22 there exists bijection g : X Y XN N N  and identical self-mapping  \X X N .  That is why 
desirable bijection is the following: 
id[ ], \
f[ ]
g[ ],
x x X X
x
x x X Y
   
N
N N
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.25. Theorem. Let X  be non-denumerable, andYN j – denumerable sets. There exists bijection 
f : \X X Y N . 
Proof. Set \X YN  is non-denumerable, since if not, because of 3.22, set ( \ )X Y Y XN N  would have 
been denumerable. But from 3.23 it flows out, that there exists one-to-one mapping 
f : ( \ )X Y Y N N \X YN , which precisely represents desirable  
 
Products of sets 
Now we would like to say some words about very important construction of the theory of sets – sets 
product. This construction has already been tacitly used by us for the examples 3.20.3,4, and we will 
investigate it in details in future. 
Let IX { } be some kind of sets plurality, where I is some plurality of indices. In the case of 
denumerable set I  product of sets is defined univalently  
 
1 2 3
..
I
Y X X X X   
 
     , 
as plurality of, let us say, “words” 1 2 3( , , ,..)x x x : 
 
 
 
1 2 3 1 1 2 2 3 3( , , ,..) : , , ,..
I
X x x x x X x X x X   
 
   = { } , 
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where conditions of “letters” x  belonging to co-ordinates sets X  and their order are enumerated. 
Generalization of co-ordinate sets for non-denumerable set is possible, but only in the case, if indices set  
 
 
 
I is perfectly well ordered. It is only then, when we can say, that co-ordinate set X  is a successor of   
X  , or quite the reverse, and put down “word” 1 2 3( ... ...)x x x x x  , which complies with the point of 
product.  
At each  I   mapping of projecting is defined p :
I
X X  

   for  -multiplier of product 
according to the principle: p [ ]x x   for each 
I
x X

  . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
About numbers and their notation 
 
The notion of whole number “one”, for which graphic symbol «1» is adopted, presents primary 
notion. It is pure “form” without reference to substance, and consequently, it also presents equivalence 
relation, explicitly expressed by this notion. Claims of the theory of sets to definition of the whole number  
as the category of “equivalent sets” are groundless, since in the notion of equivalent sets the notion of 
bijection – one-to-one correspondence is already imbedded , and consequently the notion of “one”.  
The whole numbers are defined inductively. For example, record type «2 = 1+1» is definition of 
graphic symbol «2», and etc.  The whole numbers, along with the principle of mathematical induction, 
into which the principle of transfinitary induction degenerates in normally ordered set of the whole 
numbers, precede [4] any science. Poincare used to write: “...it is difficult to say a phrase, without 
introducing into it word «number», or word «several», or, after all, some word in plural number”. And 
further, not without poignant sarcasm: “Burali-Forti defines number 1 in the following way: 
1 { ( , ) ( , )}iT Ko U h U Un   . This definition is extremely suited to provide a glimpse of number 1 to those, 
who have never heard anything about it!”. And then he points out circulus vitiosus both in this 
“definition”, and in all subsequent attempts to define the whole numbers proceeding from “arche-
principles”.  
Subtle representation of definition of the whole numbers can be found in the first chapters [4,13]; 
we will not repeat ourselves. But we would like to consider the issue of “presentation of real numbers” 
and proofs of some theorems associated with it. 
Let [0,1]E   be unit segment of real numbers, n 0,1,..., 1X n { }  – plurality, comprised of whole 
numbers 0,1,..., 1n  , and n nD X – denumerable Cartesian product of such sets, the element of which 
“word” 1 2( , ,...)x x , where any “letter” ix  is equal to certain number out of     0,1,..., 1n  . Index of the 
letter is called place of the letter.  
Mapping nf :D E , which puts in correspondence to each word 1 2( , ,...)x x  out of nD  number 
x out of E  in compliance with convention / iix x n ,  is surjective – common number can correspond 
to two different words. In order to make the correspondence bijective, the agreement is reached to reject 
the words, having either 0 , or        1n  in units period. Most often the rejected words are those, which have 
0 in their period. That is why we will agree to consider words 1 2( , ,..., (0))kx x x  “dead”, whereas the rest of 
the words – “alive”, also including word (0(0)) , which has unique representation. Let us designate the set 
of “dead” words as n 1 2( , ,..., (0))kM x x x . Now the abovementioned mapping n nf : \D M E is bijective. 
It is easy to see, that the number of “dead” words is denumerable: the plurality of words with length 
up to k -steenth place is finite, and nM  presents their countable union. And further on – 3.22. 
Underneath we will consider five theorems, this or that way connected with Cantor name, and 
which  once laid the foundation for active investigations in the theory of sets.  
 
3.26. Theorem. Set E is non-denumerable.  
Proof 1. In proving non-denumerability of real numbers set E , the opposite is assumed, that  set of alive 
words, univalently cohering E , is denumerable. And in n -fold notation, graph of alive words is 
constructed  
 
1 1,1 1,2 1,( , ,..., ,..)kx x x x  
2 2,1 2,2 2,( , ,..., ,..)kx x x x  
….…………………….. 
,1 ,2 ,( , ,..., ,..)n n n n kx x x x  
….…………………….. 
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Later, by “Cantor diagonal method”, word 1 2( , ,..., ,..)ky y y y  is constructed, where “ k -steenth letter 
ky  of word y  is selected different from letter 0 and letter ,k kx  of word kx ”. As a result of it, we get 
alive word, which do not belong to the initial denumerable set, since it differs from any other word from 
the graph by some kind of letter. It is contradiction, which proves, that the set of alive words can not be 
denumerable. The key role here is played by “magic phrase”, italicized above, which is three-pace 
function ,p[0, , ]k k ky k x , and not letters selection function  f , which, by reason of its definition, can not 
be determined by merely number of the word or column in the graph. If, for example, we 
assume ( 1) f[ ]ky n k   , where ,f[ ] k kk x , then by virtue of graph equivocation, disregarding 
what kind of function the choice function could be – not necessarily  ,f[ ] k kk x , it may turn out, 
that, starting from some k m , it will be precisely ( 1) f[ ] 0n k   . And the obtained word will belong 
to the set of dead words, just because of that it does not appertain to source graph. Hence, there is no 
contradiction.  
 
Proof   2. The other one, which also ascends to Cantor, among the existing proofs of non-denumerability of 
unit segment points set, was mastered by us in Section 1. It is barely fallible.  
 
Proof 3.  Later, in theorem 3.27 we will see, that there exists bijection 2g:D E , though not so trivial, as 
for 2 2f : \D M E . And we just have to convince ourselves, that set 2D  is non-denumerable. But again, 
assuming the opposite, that 2D  is denumerable set, we construct graph of words out of 2D , and by 
“Cantor diagonal method” the word 1 2( , ,..., ,..)ky y y y  is constructed, where  ,1k k ky x  , which does not 
appertain to source graph of words. We pay attention that, at stated construction of word, choice function 
is strictly defined: ,f[ ] k kk k x   
 
3.27. Theorem. There exists bijection 2g:D E  
Proof 1.Relying upon denumerability of set nM  and theorem 3.25, existence of bijection g: nD E is 
compelling. 
Proof 2. Let /k n  be any irreducible fraction out of whole numbers 2k  and / 1k n  . Let us consider 
subset /k nK  out of E , comprising numbers category /
i
ix kx n  ,  where word 1 2 3( , , ,...)x x x  is taken out 
of  2D .Taking into account, that mapping 2 2f: \D M E      is bijective , we get the following diagram  of 
associations  
-1
h
2 /
2 2 f
\
k nD K
D M E

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result of it: set E  is bijectively mapped on subset  2 2\D M  of set 2D , and set 2D  is bijectively 
mapped on subset /k nK   of set E . And Shroder-Bernstein theorem predicates existence of bijection 
2g:D E   
 
From proof  2, as direct consequence we get 
 
3.28. Theorem. There exists bijection -1 /h g : k nE K . 
 
3.29. Comment. Plurality 2/3K  matches Cantor perfect set. We have to remind, which way it is comes. 
Unit segment is divided into three equal parts, and the middle part is cleared out. The remaining segments 
are again divided into three parts, and in each of them the middle interval is cleared out, and etc. The 
thing, which remains after such calculation procedure is called Cantor perfect set. At this, the sum of 
lengths of the cleared out intervals is equal to one. It was the first example of geometrically intuitively 
constructed non-demunerable, equivalent to unit segment of pretty “thin” set  
 
3.30. Theorem. There exists bijection nf : E Em . 
 
 
Proof. First of all, let us consider the proof of existence of bijection between unit segment E and its 
square 2E E E  .  
The proof rests on Cantor observation, that for each two words 1 2( , ,...)x x  and  1 2( , ,...)y y compound 
word 1 1 2 2( , , , ,...)x y x y also turns to be one-to-one. If the original words were alive, then the compound 
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word would for sure be alive. However, the opposite assertion will be l. For example, any alive word type 
1 2( , ,..., (01))kx x x , or 1 2( , ,..., (0001))kx x x  and etc.,  can not be represented by two alive words, and hence, 
as long ago as Dedekind noticed, they do not have their representation in E E .  The above-stated does 
not depend on the numbers notation, which we choose.  
 
However the required bijection exists. Noticing one-to-one mapping of the interval in square subset, 
for example g : (0)E E  , and taking into consideration the above bijection of the square in the interval 
subset, the only remaining thing is to use Shroder-Bernstein theorem.  
The result is plainly generalized by any finite product nE . But even for denumerable product it is 
impossible to prove by the above procedure the existence of one-to-one mapping EN in subset  E , since 
we will not be able to record “word”, matching any point E , because the whole “length” of word E will 
be occupied by the first three letters of the words out of  EN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let FN  be a designation for the set of all functions, mapping the set of positive numbers N  in two-
point set 2 0,1X  { } . 
 
3.31. Theorem. There exists bijection f :E F N . 
 Proof. For each g F N  the consecutive order of its value on N  represents consecutive order of zeros 
and ones, and consequently each function in one-to-one manner corresponds to some point out of 2D . 
But, as we have seen in 3.27, there exists bijection 2g:D E , and that is why bijection f :E F N does 
exist  
 
Let EF  designate the plurality of all functions, mapping E  in 2 0,1X  { } . 
 
 
3.32. Theorem. Bijection f : EE F  does not exists. 
Proof. Let us assume the opposite – that such bijection f : EE F exists. It is choice function f[ ] gxx   
and by assumption it is of the kind, that gE x
x E
F

  . However, function h[ ] 1 g [ ]xx x   does not appertain 
to this set, since it differs from any of the functions g x by its value precisely in point x .  Consequently, 
there is no bijection.   
 
 
But there exists bijection E in subset EF : for each point x  function  f [ ]x y  is put in correspondence, 
and the function takes, for instance, value 1 in point y x , and 0 in other points  
 
Comparative survey 
 
Hereinafter we will carry out brief comparative survey of the basic notions of  ZF-theory of sets, 
see, for example [16], which, for the sake of picturesque, we will call “the world of Georg Cantor”, and 
RL-theory of sets, which we will, respectively call “the world of Henri Poincare”.   
   
Photo 1.                                                                     Photo2.  
Georg Cantor                                                                 Henri Poincare 
(1845-1918)                                                                                  (1854 – 1912) 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                         
In the world of Poincare Universal of points is described – immense object as well as the relations, 
in which the points exist with respect to each other. Each of the points is an undefinable object of our 
consciousness. It is a mental image of some relation of equivalency. And the “point” will remain the 
“point”, until the relation is found, which will “split” it into all kinds of “points”. That is why the notion 
“potency of a set” for relations language looses its sense – it becomes “nondimensionalized” with respect 
to “language luxuriance”, used in the theory, and this emphasizes relativism of notions of sets theory. 
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In Universal new points can also appear, when new relations arise, which bind this point with the 
other points. Before that it would be beyond the “visible horizon” of the Universal. That is why the 
horizon of points Universal moves far and far away, while we cognize it deeper and deeper.  
 
Sets in the world of Poincare are nothing more than “distinguished” – “categorized”, or “filtered” 
points of Universal; they are not singled out by set name. If set is infinite, then with respect to each 
“produced” point we can always say, whether it belongs to the set under consideration, or not. But the 
infinite set itself in the world of Poincare is impossible to “produce” – it is always just “potentially” 
infinite sets.  
 In the world of Cantor there exists Universal of sets. The horizon of this Universal, even if it is 
fixed, it is fixed only under the antecedent that the Universal itself is other than a set. And the set is not 
just “plurality” of points, which can be conceived as single entity, but precisely as entity, which will 
obligatory be at the same time a “member” of some other set. Moreover, infinite sets in the world of 
Cantor always represent “actually” infinite sets.  
 
 
It is a kind of visionary world: “ex nihilo” – out of “null-set”  , “something” – ,  { { } ,{{ }} ,...} is 
easily obtained ; “cogitation” is sufficient to represent the set as a point of the other set.  
As a result, there appear such objects, as “set XP [ ] , the elements of which are all kinds of subsets 
of set X ”. And there are no limits for such objects, as n XP [ ] and etc. It makes it possible within the 
course of proving some   theorems to view different, even not overlapping subsets, either in the quality of 
different points (and then, for example, mapping f: X YP [ ] could be found), or again in the quality of 
subsets. Maybe, it is just this duality of the notion of set-object, where readiness lies in, which facilitates 
overcoming of difficulties, associated with proofs of some theorems.  
And for relation language null-set does not exist: it is invariably that x x { } , and the set appears as 
a point only when it is brought to life by some relation of equivalency; now, there exist sets, for which 
X X P [ ] , but always 2 P P ; in an explicit form unprovable statements appear, etc.  
 
If in the world of Poincare the primary interest particularly lies in investigation of relations among 
the sets, then in the world of Cantor the relations play though very important, but all the same, auxiliary 
role. Among the possible inter-set relations the most important is one-to-one correspondence – bijection. 
In Universal of sets bijection is relation of equivalence.  That is why the equivalent class is objectivized   
and named potency of a set.  
 
But to our point of view, the whole world of Cantor rests on one fundamental premise – on Cantor 
axiom 3.19.1. This axiom, never decisively asserted by Cantor, is not “the law of ideation”, but namely 
axiom of existence in random set of certain transitive-reflexive relation, which together with Shoeder-
Bernstein theorem guaranteed for any two sets, that either one of them is bijectively mapped in some 
subset of the other, or they are equivalent. That is why subsets potencies can be compared as usual 
numbers. Afterwards confidence in this was given by Zemerlo theorem, which narrowed down Cantor 
axiom to axiom of choice, the axiom, which before that moment seemed so trivial, that it was not clearly 
stated. Then in reality there appeared such thing, which now is called theory of sets.  
Except that, neither Cantor theorem, guaranteeing the existence of  potencies scale, nor Zemerlo 
theorem, guaranteeing the possibility to absolutely put in order any set, can not be considered proved for 
relations language, since they use indefinite statements. Moreover, Cantor axiom, to our mind, in 
principle can not be narrowed down to choice axiom: it incorporates two linked existential quantifiers, 
and choice axiom – only one.  
 
On the other hand, it is possible just to accept Cantor axiom – it can not be refuted; especially 
because there exist examples for which it is fulfilled. In regard to potencies scale, its “existence” is easy 
to be grounded on the examples of existence of denumerable, non-denumerable and non-equivalent sets, 
for instance Cantor theorem 3.23. And since these “potencies” can be compared, then, maybe, these are 
the two circumstances, which once upon a time compelled Hilbert to declare, that: “Nothing can 
exostracize us from paradise, created for us by Cantor”. And it is really so. 
 
In the world of Poincare, due to indeterminateness of Universal boundaries, there is no such a 
notion as “sets equivalence class” – it is simply not defined, and consequently there is no notion of 
“potency”. On the other hand, the notion of equivalence of two sets makes it possible, in concept, to 
speak, following Neyman, about “representer” of this “class”. But the relations, in which these 
“representers” exist is determined particularly by Cantor axiom and transfinite induction theorem, flowing 
out of it.   
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But it is just Cantor axiom that we do not accept. To our mind, this axiom not only narrows the 
range of vision (as we already pointed out many times, it contains two linked existential quantifiers, and 
statement 3.18, being considered as choice axiom, has only one), but, and it is the most important thing, 
via the null-set, it opens the door into the world of statements, which are undefined and consequently 
unprovable by relations language.   
And the existence of choice function in the world of Poincare is accepted not as “choice axiom”, 
but it is the direct consequence of point identifier definition, though at any specific construction the 
choice, as such, has to be made.  
 
 
As in the world of Cantor, the notion of bijection is one of the most important notions in the world 
of Poincare. But now the issue of existence of bijection between the sets, or, speaking the language of 
theory of sets, definition, whether these sets are located in the same “class”, or in which relations “class 
representers” exist, each time requires discrete exploration. We set enough examples, moreover classical 
ones, which way bijection absence or existence is determined, without resorting to the notion of 
cardinalities. For sure, it gives hard time, makes the life more prosy, but in return, saves us from all and 
even potential paradoxes of sets theory. It is just because in the world of Poincare there are no indefinite 
statements, the relations are specified, and … 
And the only thing remaining is just to “calculate”. Maybe, all these things are a bit sobersided, but 
it is the reality of the world of Henri Poincare. And though as the result of calculations we can come to an 
unprovable statement, it should not embarrass us. We are not gods, at long last, as it seemed to someone 
at the beginning of the XX century. 
 
Section 4. Binary relations filters 
 
 
 
 
 
What is usually meant by the words “mathematical structure”? As Bourbaki used to write [27],   
“The common feature of different notions, united by this generic term, is their applicability to the set of 
elements, the nature of which is not found. In order to identify the structure, one or several relations, in 
which its elements exist, are preset; then it is stated, that the given relation or relations satisfy some 
conditions(which are specified and which are axioms of the structure under consideration)”. 
But in this interpretation of structure word-combination “some conditions” provides too wide 
latitude for whims – any objects-points satisfy some conditions. But everybody understands that a 
bourock is not a building – a synonym of the word “structure”. The relations, in which the sets exist, 
should contain certain common ab indication that we really deal precisely with a building, but not a 
bourock. 
So, any mathematical structure represents subset X  of elements of some set Y ,       the subset isolated 
by some characteristics.  
 
Actually, this way we defined the notion of “set” X , where in the quality of Y  we had Universal 
of points F , and а the indicator of point x  appurtenance to X  was identifier  i  of set X , which 
reproduced only the property of reflexivity of relation i on Universal of points F . 
 
Adding to the property of relation to be reflexive the property to be also transitive, we come to 
“ordered structures” of four types: partially, normally, linearly, and well-ordered sets.   
 
In regard to the structures univalently defined by any of its elements and brought to existence by 
some plurality I of relations r I  { } , whether it be a group, topological space and etc, it is necessary to 
require from the relations, which induce the structure, to involve combined properties of reflexivity, 
transitivity and symmetry. It is only then, that a structure is induced by some relation of equivalency, let 
us say, rJ  in F , expressing some kind of typical features. But relation of equivalency rJ is not known to 
us. But we should note, that if two points out of F  exist in certain relation r , they should also exist in 
relation rJ ; and the opposite, if a pair of points exist in relation rJ , then they must exist in certain relation 
r  out of plurality. By this required rJ  emerges as the smallest upper edge of relations plurality r I { } , 
which induces mathematical structure, i.e.  rJ rI  ; accordingly, the largest lower edge will be 
designated as rj rI   .   
Both the lower and the upper edges can belong to the plurality. Then we may speak about minimal 
and, respectively, about maximal elements of the plurality. And in order to obtain the description of all the 
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mathematical structures, univalently defined by any of its elements, the only thing remaining is to find out 
the conditions, which should be imposed on elements of relations plurality, for rJ to be the relation of 
equivalency.  
Hereinafter, in three definitions we lumped different conditions for the elements of relations 
plurality, which ensure the property of the upper edge to be reflexive, symmetric and transitive. The 
conditions are put down in such a way, that satisfaction of any of the axioms results in satisfaction of the 
axioms, which are predecessors of it. 
 
4.1. Definition. Plurality of Relations r I  { }  in F  is called 
1. Weakly reflexive, if Trr : ( [r ] )x x x   .  
2. Normally reflexive, if o o Trr : ( [r ] )x x x  . 
3. Strongly reflexive, if Trr ( [r ] )x x x   . 
 
 
4.2. Definition. Plurality of relations r I  { }  in F  is called 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Weakly symmetric, if Tr Trr , r :( [r ] ) ( [r ] )x y x y y x       . 
2. Normally symmetric, if 1r r : r r   
   . 
 
3. Uniformly symmetric, if at normal symmetric properties 1r r : r r   
   . 
4. Strongly symmetric, if 1r : r r    . 
 
4.3. Definition. Plurality of relations r I  { }  in F  is called 
 
 
 
1. Weakly transitive, if Tr Tr Trr , r , , r :( [r ] ) ( [r ] ) ( [r ] )x y z x y y z x z          . 
2. Normally transitive, if r ,r r : r r r         .  
3. Locally uniformly transitive, if at normal transitivity there is also r r ,r : r [ ] r r [ ]x x x          . 
4. Uniformly transitive, if at normal transitivity r r ,r : r r r         . 
 
Later, speaking about plurality of relations   on F , which satisfies some of the above specified 
axioms, we will indicate numbers of the respective idioms for plurality symbol:  the first will be the 
number of the axiom, which is responsible for reflexivity of the upper edge, the second – for 
symmetricity, and the third will indicate the axiom, which is responsible for transitivity of the upper edge. 
Thus, for instance, weakly reflexive, weakly symmetric and normally transitive plurality of relations is 
112 -plurality. 
Out of possible conditions for plurality elements, which ensure the property of the upper edge to be 
the relation of equivalency, it is necessary to identify those, which will ensure the possibility of 
constructive analysis of its properties, at preserving of initially built-in commonality in statement of the 
question. Let us start with the examples. 
 
 
4.4. Examples. Hereinafter, , ,R R R  will be the designations for the set of real numbers and the subset of 
positive and strictly positive real numbers. Designations   , ,Q Q Q  have analogous sense for subsets of 
rational numbers. 
1. Natural topology of real numbers: let RF , and I R . We will consider that y out of F  exists 
in relation r  with x  out of F , if | |x y   , where I  .  
 
 
Let us consider plurality of relations r I { } . It is clear that r [ ]x x  at any r , and each r  is 
strongly symmetric. And finally, for any ,   one can find      of such kind, that r r r   ; the 
opposite is also true. Hence, we got 344 -plurality of relations in F . 
 
2. Groups (of transformations). Let in set F  some 222 -plurality of algebraic relations be preset. 
Hence, there exists 0r id ; for any r one can find 1r r  ;  finally, for all r  and r  one can find 
r r r    . Recollecting associativity of composition of relations, we will get, that 222 -plurality of 
algebraic relations is a group (of transformations) 
 
Analogous analysis of the other examples from topology and functional analysis show, that 
common conditions for elements of relations plurality, which induce miscellaneous mathematical 
structures, are: weak reflexivity, weak symmetric property, and normal transitivity. Moreover, normal 
transitivity is guaranteed by definition of composition for random relations. Later, the lower edge of 
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plurality (in the first example it is trivial, and in the second it is primitive) is not an element of relations 
plurality. It produces the following:  
 
4.5. Definition. 112 -plurality of relations in F  without minimal element is identified as binary relations 
filter.  
 
When needed, we will portray the filter as pair 112;  F F{ } . Conformable to it, set F ,   in which 
the filter is defined, will be called filterable set and portrayed as pair 112;  F F{ } .  
 
Filter image in point x  is the name for set rJ [ ]x . In different points x  out of domain of definition 
the filter can have different image (– equivalency classes, or, as we will say, – strata).  
Filter germ 112;  F F{ } will be the name for lower edge of relations plurality, which induces 
filter, with image rj [ ]x  in some point xF .  
 
Sub-filter of filter 112;  F F{ }  is the name for the filter, which is obtained by narrowing the 
domain of definition (relations plurality) of the initial filter:  112 112;      F F F{ } . 
 
 
When the filters under investigation have similar domain of definition, we will specify only the 
pluralities of relations corresponding them. 
 
As a result of it, both investigation of the filters and all kinds of relations between them become the 
subject of the mathematics. Thus, variational calculus investigates mappings extremals of the set being 
filtered into natural topology filter of the real numbers; differential and integral equations investigate 
different kinds of mappings of different strata of functions sets, being filtered inside themselves, etc.  
 
From this point on, much attention will be compelled to 312 -filters. It is just they, that will lead us 
to broader synthesis of the notion “topological space” and the other intriguing objects, which do not 
satisfy standard axioms of topological structures.  
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